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Cameron: The Modified Just Rule

THE MODIFIED JUST RULE: A NEW STANDARD
FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF
OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS OR ACTS UNDER
RULES 403 AND 404(b) OF THE MONTANA
RULES OF EVIDENCE
Robert Cameron*
I.

INTRODUCTION

An individual is arrested and charged with burglary and theft.
The accused was arrested four years ago for burglary, but not convicted. Six months before the alleged burglary and theft the accused was convicted of writing bad checks and is currently under
investigation for spouse abuse. May the state introduce evidence of
the accused's other crimes, wrongs, or acts in its burglary/theft
prosecution?'
In Montana other crimes evidence2 has been subject to widely
varying standards of admissibility. The Montana Supreme Court
has been extremely inconsistent in its application of the other
crimes rule over the years. The law has changed again significantly.
Rule 404(b) of the Montana Rules of Evidence provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.3

From 1979 to 1991, Montana law mandated that other crimes
evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) only if it met the four
criteria of the Just Rule.4 Just required the party offering the evi* The author wishes to thank Professor William F. Crowley, University of Montana
School of Law. Any errors or omissions are the author's alone.
1. For reasons more fully discussed infra, the court would probably find that the prior
burglary is too remote in time to be relevant; the incident involving the accused's writing
bad checks is too dissimilar to the pending charges; and the alleged spouse abuse is too
dissimilar to the pending charges, and unduly prejudicial. Thus, none of the other crimes
evidence would be admissible.
2. Such evidence, although often described as other crimes evidence, extrinsic acts evidence, or bad acts evidence, includes all evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts. Such acts
need not be wrongful or criminal in nature. State v. Gilpin, 232 Mont. 56, 65, 756 P.2d 445,
450 (1988). The author intends references to "other crimes evidence" to include all evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts.
3. MONT. R. EvID. 404(b).
4. State v. Just, 184 Mont. 262, 268-69, 602 P.2d 957, 961 (1979). In 1979 the court
adopted a four-element test to determine the admissibility of other crimes evidence. This
test, commonly referred to as the Just Rule, is based on three criteria identified in State v.
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dence to demonstrate that the other crimes, wrongs or acts (1)
were similar in nature; (2) were not remote in time; (3) tended to
establish a common scheme, plan or system; and (4) the probative
value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its
prejudice to the party against whom the evidence was offered.'
In State v. Matt6 the court modified the admissibility criteria
for evidence of other crimes.7 Specifically, the court eliminated the
third element of the Just limitation, which required a showing of a
common scheme, plan or system.'
This comment reviews the history of other crimes evidence in
Montana and explores the current status of other crimes evidence
as enunciated in State v. Matt.' Next, a comparison of case law
governed by the original Just Rule with cases under the Modified
Just Rule demonstrates the extent to which the modified rule departs from its predecessor. An examination of the adequacy of the
procedural protections of the Modified Just Rule explores the degree to which defendants are afforded protection from unfair
prejudice. Additionally, this article addresses the need for the
Montana Supreme Court to render more consistent decisions regarding the admissibility of other crimes evidence. Finally, this
comment suggests substantive and procedural schemes which place
increased emphasis on the plain language of the Montana Rules of
Evidence, as a means through which the courts can achieve a
proper balance between the competing interests of defendants and
prosecutors when Rule 404(b) questions arise.

II.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS OR ACTS

During the past forty years, the Montana Supreme Court has
alternatively contracted and expanded the circle delineating the
scope of admissible other crimes evidence in criminal proceedings.10 The court's adoption of the Modified Just Rule in Matt" is
Jensen, 153 Mont. 233, 239, 455 P.2d 631, 634 (1969), coupled with the prohibition of unduly prejudicial evidence contained in MONT. R. EvID. 403. Just at 268-69, 602 P.2d at 961.
5. Just, 184 Mont. at 269, 602 P.2d at 961; State v. Keefe, 232 Mont. 258, 266, 759
P.2d 128, 133 (1988).
6. Mont. -,
814 P.2d 52 (1991).
7. Id. at -,
814 P.2d at 56; see also State v. Paulson, Mont....
817 P.2d
1137, 1141 (1991); State v. McKnight, Mont ....
820 P.2d 1279, 1281 (1991).
8. Matt at -,
814 P.2d at 56.
9. Id. at -,
814 P.2d at 52.
10. No Montana Supreme Court case has, to date, answered the question of whether
Rule 404(b) applies in the civil context. The court has, however, described the original Just
Rule as "a four element rule to determine the admissibility of evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts in criminal prosecutions." State v. Matt, Mont. -,... 814 P.2d 52, 55
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the latest chapter in the ever-changing status of the other crimes
rule in Montana.
In the early 1900s Montana followed the common law rule that
held other crimes evidence inadmissible if offered for the sole purpose of showing that a party had a bad character. 12 Other crimes
evidence would not necessarily be excluded if it incidentally cast a
party's character in a bad light." The Montana Supreme Court
followed the common law rule that held evidence of a distinct and
independent offense generally inadmissible; however, such evidence could be admissible if it tended to show an accused's uniform plan or action, to prove identity, knowledge, intent, or to disprove inadvertence or mistake."'
In 1951, however, the Montana Supreme Court in State v.
Sauter16 launched its departure from the practice followed in most
American jurisdictions. In Sauter the trial court admitted witness
testimony of a prior rape involving the accused and a different victim."6 The Montana Supreme Court reversed Sauter's conviction,
holding that the evidence failed to establish a systematic scheme
or plan and was thus inadmissible.1 7 Sauter established a rule that
barred evidence of an accused's prior sex crimes.' Later, the court
interpreted Sauter as prohibiting the admission of other crimes evidence for any purpose, regardless of the circumstances. ' 9 The
(1991) (emphasis added).
The applicability of Rule 404(b) in the civil context was brought before the Montana
Supreme Court in Smith v. Roosevelt County, 242 Mont. 27, 36, 788 P.2d 895, 901 (1990).
The court refused to address the merits of the issue, raised for the first time on appeal,
because the plaintiff failed to object to the Rule 404(b) jury instruction at the district court
level. Id.
A number of other jurisdictions have addressed this question and determined that Rule
404(b) does, indeed, apply to other crimes evidence in civil cases. See, e.g., Lapierre v. Sawyer, 557 A.2d 640, 642 (N.H. 1989); Johnson v. Truck Ins. Exch., 285 Ark. 470, 475, 688
S.W.2d 728, 731 (1985); Meyer v. City and County of Honolulu, 69 Haw. 8, 9, 731 P.2d 149,
150 (1986); Tempo, Inc. v. Rapid Elec. Sales & Serv., Inc., 132 Mich. App. 93, 100, 347
N.W.2d 728, 731 (1984); State v. Grogan, 628 P.2d 570, 572 (Alaska 1981). Additionally, the
United States Supreme Court has noted that Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence
"applies in both civil and criminal cases." Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685
(1988).
11. Mont.....
814 P.2d 52, 56 (1991).
12. See, e.g., State v. Cesar, 72 Mont. 252, 255, 232 P. 1109, 1109 (1924); State v.
Hopkins, 68 Mont. 504, 510, 219 P. 1106, 1108 (1923).
13. Id.
14. State v. Pippi, 59 Mont. 116, 121, 195 P. 556, 558 (1921).
15. 125 Mont. 109, 232 P.2d 731 (1951).
16. Sauter at 117, 232 P.2d at 735.
17. Id. at 112, 232 P.2d at 732.
18. Id. at 113, 232 P.2d at 733.
19. State v. Searle, 125 Mont. 467, 471, 239 P.2d 995, 997 (1952). As Justice Metcalf's
dissent in Searle indicates, "we now learn that the rule [promulgated in Sauter] is a flat
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Searle decision's absolute ban on all other crimes evidence thus
placed Montana in a unique position among American
jurisdictions.
The Montana Supreme Court began a retreat from the peculiar Sauter-Searle rule in the early 1960s.10 In State v. Merritt the
court recognized the existence of certain extremely limited exceptions to the general rule excluding other crimes evidence, but the
exceptions could apply only when the other crime was closely connected to the crime charged.2 Merritt and subsequent decisions
thus blurred the distinction between the other crimes rule and the
transaction rule.22
Montana's turning point in the admissibility of other crimes
evidence occurred in 1969 in State v. Jensen.23 In Jensen the court
established a three-element test to determine whether other crimes
evidence could properly be admitted: (1) Similarity, (2) Nearness
in time, and (3) Tendency to establish a common scheme, plan or
system.2 4 The court in Jensen specifically overruled State v. Searle
to the extent that Searle held evidence of other crimes as always
inadmissible.2 5
On July 1, 1977, the Montana Rules of Evidence, including
Rule 404(b), took effect pursuant to Montana Supreme Court order. 26 The Montana Supreme Court Commission on Rules of Evidence adopted the final draft of Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of
declaration that evidence of other crimes is not admissible for any purpose. This constitutes
a reversal of many precedents in the criminal law of this state." Id. at 479-80, 239 P.2d at
1001 (Metcalf, J., dissenting).
20. See State v. Merritt, 138 Mont. 546, 357 P.2d 683 (1960); State v. Teidmann, 139
Mont. 237, 362 P.2d 529 (1960); State v. Tully, 148 Mont. 166, 418 P.2d 549 (1960).
21. Merritt at 548, 357 P.2d at 684.
22. The transaction rule is essentially the res gestae doctrine; i.e., any declaration, act
or omission which forms a part of the litigated event, or transaction, is admissible. MONT.
CODE ANN. § 26-1-103 (1991). In State v. Rollins, 149 Mont. 481, 483, 428 P.2d 462, 463
(1967), the court noted an exception to the general rule that other crimes evidence is inadmissible, when a criminal act is so closely related to the act for which the defendant is
charged as to form a part of the res gestae. The Montana Supreme Court later acknowledged that other crimes evidentiary rules simply have no application where the purported
other crime is inextricably or inseparably linked with the crime charged. State v. Romero,
224 Mont. 431, 438, 730 P.2d 1157, 1162 (1984). More recently, however, the court returned
to a Rollins type of analysis, holding that other crimes evidence may be introduced if it is
"inextricably or inseparably related to the crime charged." State v. Wolfe, Mont.
-,
821 P.2d 339, 346 (1991).
23. 153 Mont. 233, 455 P.2d 631 (1969).
24. Jensen at 239, 455 P.2d at 634.
25. Id. at 239, 455 P.2d at 634.
26. Sup. Ct. Ord. 12729. Under the 1972 Montana Constitution, art. VII, § 2, par. 3,
the Montana Supreme Court has the power to "make rules governing appellate procedure,
[and] practice and procedure for all other courts."
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Evidence for the purpose of uniformity with the federal rule. 7 The
Commission also intended that "there be no change in the admissibility of such evidence under existing Montana law." 8 The adoption of Rule 404(b) did not affect the status of case law developed
before the rule became operative. Accordingly, the Montana Supreme Court has not hesitated to rely on pre-1977 case law 9 to
support post-1977 decisions.
The other crimes rule enunciated in Jensen3 remained effective for ten years, and was revised by the Montana Supreme Court
in State v. Just." From Just emerged a four-element test to determine the admissibility of evidence of prosecution for other
crimes.3 The Just test was an amalgam of the three elements set
forth in Jensen, plus the provisions of the recently adopted Rule
403 of the Montana Rules of Evidence.33
III.

STATE V. MATT, AN EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE

404(b)

On November 10, 1988, Allen Ray "Speedy" Matt went to the
office of the Flathead Irrigation Project.3" At the Project office,
Matt attempted "to get money for a windshield that he claimed
'35
had been damaged by one of [the Irrigation Project] trucks.
When Matt failed to get the money, he threw a rock through a
36
Project office window.
A tribal officer went to Speedy Matt's residence later that day
to discuss the incident at the Irrigation Project.3 7 An altercation
occurred between Matt and the tribal officer, resulting in Matt's
arrest.3 8 Matt continued to resist, escaped from the officer, and returned to his house.39 Matt shortly thereafter came out brandishing a knife and another fight ensued; the officer suffered injuries.4" Other officers arrived, and Matt was placed in a police
27. Commission Comments, MONT. R. EVID. 404(b).
28. Id.
29. E.g., Jensen, 153 Mont. 233, 455 P.2d 631.
30. See supra text accompanying note 24.
31. 184 Mont. 262, 602 P.2d 957 (1979).
32. See supra text accompanying note 5.
33. MONT. R. EviD. 403 provides, inter alia, that evidence may be excluded if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the proffered evidence.
34. State v. Matt, Mont ..
814 P.2d 52, 54 (1991).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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vehicle.4 Matt repeatedly kicked the door of the vehicle, was removed from the vehicle and was finally subdued.,2 Matt was convicted of felony assault following a jury trial; he then appealed the
verdict to the Montana Supreme Court.4 3
A central issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly
admitted testimony concerning Matt's altercation with law enforcement in Okanogan County, Washington, which occurred three
months before the Montana incident." The prosecution argued
that the evidence of the Washington altercation was relevant to
show Matt's state of mind or intent at the time of the alleged assault.4 5 The prosecution contended this was admissible under Rule
404(b) of the Montana Rules of Evidence.4' The defense argued
that such evidence did not establish a common scheme, plan or
system, and therefore did not satisfy the requirements of the Just
Rule. 47 Thus the trial court's admission of the evidence, the defense asserted, was reversible error.4 8
After surveying the development of the Just Rule, the Montana Supreme Court determined that the other crimes rule in recent years had unduly narrowed the scope of evidence admissible
under Rule 404(b).4 ' Specifically, the court recognized "that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may be admissible for many
other purposes, including those specifically listed in Rule 404(b), as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. ' 50 The court concluded
that the Just Rule should be modified.5 The Modified Just Rule
as adopted in State v. Matt states:
1) The other crimes, wrongs or acts must be similar.
2) The other crimes, wrongs or acts must not be remote in time.
3) The evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted
in conformity with such character; but may be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

50.

Id. at __,

51.

Id.

at
at
at
at
at

__,

814
814
814
814
814

-,

814 P.2d at 55.

-,

__,
__,
-,

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d

53.
54.
54-55.
55.
54.

814 P.2d at 56.
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4) Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading of the jury, considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
52
cumulative evidence.
Consequently, under the Modified Just Rule, failure of the
other crimes evidence to demonstrate a common scheme, plan or
system no longer precludes admission of the evidence in Montana
courts. The Montana Supreme Court now recognizes that the Just
element described as "common scheme, plan or system" is to be
classed as a "plan" under Rule 404(b).5 3 A showing of common
scheme, plan or system is now viewed as merely one of the many
purposes for which other crimes evidence may be admitted.
A.

Analysis of the Modified Just Rule,

Contrasted with the OriginalJust Rule
1. Similarity-The First Element
The Original Just Rule:
The prosecution must show the similarity of the other crimes or
5
acts. 4
The Modified Just Rule:
The other crimes, wrongs or acts must be similar.55
The Montana Supreme Court's inconsistent application of the
6
similarity element is perhaps best illustrated by State v. Hansen,"
a case involving an appeal from a conviction of sexual intercourse
without consent. The defendant (Hansen), a friend of Hansen's,
and the complaining witness (Birdsall) met in a bar; the three then
traveled to an isolated area to smoke marijuana after the bar
closed. 7 According to Birdsall's testimony, Hansen's companion
passed out; Hansen then made sexual advances toward her.58 Birdsall testified that when she resisted, Hansen attacked her, twisted
her thumb against her wrist, and raped her. 9
At trial another witness testified that two and one-half years
52. Id.
53. Id.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

State v. Just, 184 Mont. 262, 269, 602 P.2d 957, 961 (1979).
State v. Matt, - Mont. -,
-,
814 P.2d 52, 56 (1991).
187 Mont. 91, 608 P.2d 1083 (1980).
Id. at 93, 608 P.2d at 1084.
Id.
Id. at 93, 608 P.2d at 1085.
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previously, she had accepted a ride home from the defendant after
the bars closed, and that the defendant drove her to an isolated
location where he made sexual advances toward her.60 The witness
testified that when she resisted, the defendant attacked her,
twisted her thumb against her wrist, and raped her.' The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault as a result of this earlier
attack.2
The sole issue on appeal in Hansen was whether the trial
court committed reversible error in admitting the evidence of the
earlier sexual assault.6 " Incredibly, the Montana Supreme Court
found that the prior sexual assault was not sufficiently similar to
the attack on Birdsall to meet the similarity requirement of the
Just Rule. 4 The court focused on differences such as the presence
of the defendant's passed-out companion during the second attack,
and the fact that the defendant had not met the victim before that
evening, whereas in the earlier incident, no passed-out third parties were present, and the defendant knew the victim fairly well.6
Hearkening back to Sauter, the court in Hansen observed: "Sexual
acts, whether rape or no rape, originating in barroom pickups,
powered by the urge, and consummated in automobiles, are entirely too common in this day and age to have much evidentiary
value in showing a systematic scheme or plan. '66 Consequently, the
prior rape was held to be so dissimilar that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting evidence of the earlier incident.6 '
60. Id. at 94, 608 P.2d at 1085.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The court in Hansen noted that:
Numerous rapes follow the pattern of barroom pickup, voluntary entry into the
offender's vehicle by the victim, driving to a remote area, advances, resistance and
forcible intercourse. The sequence of events has no distinctive qualities that distinguish the acts from other rapes thus bringing the events within the purview of
the similarity element of the other crimes admission rule exception.
Id. at 97, 608 P.2d at 1086.
65. Id. The court was not persuaded by the following facts:
Each incident began in a Lincoln County bar. Both victims left the bar with Hansen in the early morning hours. Hansen drove both women into the mountains and
allegedly made advances toward them. When [the victims] resisted, Hansen
grabbed them, twisted their thumbs against their wrists and forced intercourse
with them. Hansen also drove both women back to town and told them not to
report the rape.
Id. at 95, 608 P.2d at 1086 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 98, 608 P.2d at 1087 (quoting State v. Sauter, 125 Mont. 109, 112, 232 P.2d
731, 732 (1951)).
67. Hanson at 100, 608 P.2d at 1088. The practical effect of Hansen and its predecessors is to bar prosecutors from introducing other crimes evidence in cases in which rapists
follow a pattern of picking up their victims in bars. Prosecutors are thus precluded from
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Hansen's application of the similarity requirement is wholly
irreconcilable with the court's subsequent analysis. In State v.
Sadowski,58 the Montana Supreme Court again examined the degree of similarity necessary to sustain a trial court's admission of
other crimes evidence under the Just Rule.
In Sadowski the court affirmed a conviction of deliberate
homicide which occurred at Sadowski's furniture repair business at
his home near Bozeman. 9 Sadowski and his cousin were drinking
at a bar where they became acquainted with a man and his girlfriend. 0 When the bar closed, the four went to Sadowski's home
where they continued drinking. 71 Shortly thereafter, Rob Hare arrived. 72 The girlfriend introduced Hare to Sadowski and the
others.73 Sadowski testified that he eventually concluded that he
and his cousin might be in danger of being robbed by their new
acquaintances, and so he went to his bedroom and retrieved a revolver.74 Testimony at trial conflicted as to what happened next.
Sadowski testified that Hare menacingly approached him, and
when Sadowski retreated as far as he could, Sadowski fatally shot
Hare in self defense.76 Sadowski was later convicted of deliberate
homicide.76
On appeal Sadowski alleged the trial court had erred in admitting evidence of a prior incident in which Sadowski pointed a gun
at a deputy sheriff. 77 In the earlier incident, Sadowski, experiencing marital difficulties, called the sheriff's office and told sheriff's
office personnel he was going to commit suicide. 71 A deputy arrived
and talked with Sadowski for a considerable period of time.79
When Sadowski's wife returned home, the deputy rose to speak
with her, and Sadowski pointed the gun at the deputy, allegedly
stating that he now had control of the situation, rather than the
deputy. 0 The deputy managed to duck out of the house, and
introducing highly relevant evidence; rape victims picked up in bars are relegated to a comparatively unprotected status. The Montana Supreme Court should consider overturning
Hansen.
68. 247 Mont. 63, 805 P.2d 537 (1991).
69. Id. at 65-66, 805 P.2d at 538-39.
70. Id. at 66, 805 P.2d at 539.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 67, 805 P.2d at 539.
75. Id. at 68, 805 P.2d at 540.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 69, 805 P.2d at 541.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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Sadowski was subsequently arrested but not charged with a
crime. 8
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the homicide conviction, finding that "although the crimes were not identical, they
were like enough to meet the Just similarity criteria."8 2 In many
respects the two incidents were strikingly different. Nonetheless,
the court focused on common facts such as the unlawful use of a
firearm and the stressful nature of both situations and thus determined that the similarity element of Just was satisfied.8 3 A comparison of Sadowski and Hansen graphically illustrates the need
for the Montana Supreme Court to address the Modified Just
Rule's similarity criterion in a more consistent manner.
The requirement that evidence of prior acts must be similar,
in the vast majority of cases, properly functions as a safeguard
against the introduction of irrelevant evidence. The similarity requirement can, however, unnecessarily restrain trial courts from
permitting introduction of highly relevant evidence. A case decided
by the Mississippi Supreme Court illustrates the problem inherent
in Montana's apparent total ban on dissimilar Rule 404(b)
evidence. 4
At RoseMarie Hogan's trial for aggravated assault, testimony
revealed that the defendant, while riding in a van, shot six people
who were standing in front of a Vicksburg, Mississippi nightclub. 5
The state also introduced evidence that earlier in the evening of
the shooting, RoseMarie's husband went to the same nightclub to
buy marijuana. 6 While attempting to buy the marijuana, he was
beaten and robbed.17 Relying on Rule 404(b) of the Mississippi
Rules of Evidence, 88 the defense had filed a motion in limine requesting that the court preclude the state from offering any evidence bearing on the earlier incident.89 The state argued that the
earlier incident tended to show the defendant's motive for the
shooting, and was thus admissible under an enumerated exception
in Rule 404(b).10 The trial court denied the defense motion and
permitted evidence of the other crime. 9 1
81.

Id.

82. Id. at 71, 805 P.2d at 542.
83. Id. at 73, 805 P.2d at 543.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Hogan v. State, 580 So. 2d 1275 (Miss. 1991).
Id. at 1276.
Id.
Id.

88. Miss. R. Ev. 404(b) is identical to MONT. R. EVID. 404(b).
89. Hogan, 580 So. 2d at 1277.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
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On review, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that Rule
404(b) permitted evidence of the earlier incident, although RoseMarie Hogan was not involved, and the earlier incident bore no
resemblance to the act for which she was charged.2 The other
crimes evidence allowed in Hogan would likely be inadmissible
under the Modified Just Rule; it was entirely dissimilar. Still, the
evidence was highly relevant, clearly showing RoseMarie's motive
for the shooting, and was not unduly prejudicial because RoseMarie was not directly implicated in the earlier event.
As Hogan demonstrates, a strict application of the similarity
requirement of the Modified Just Rule could result in exclusion of
relevant evidence. Consequently, the Montana Supreme Court
should view the similarity element as a factor for the trial court to
consider, rather than an absolute prerequisite.9 3
2. Nearness in Time-The Second Element
The Original Just Rule:
9 4
Nearness in time of the prior conduct.
The Modified Just Rule:
9 5
The other crimes, wrongs or acts must not be remote in time.

The question of whether evidence of prior crimes is too remote
is directed to the discretion of the trial court and is a matter that
goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility,
"unless the remoteness is so great that the proffered evidence has
no value."9 6 The Montana Supreme Court has not fixed any period
of time as the definitive standard for remoteness. "[E]ach case
must be examined in light of its unique set of facts."9
The Montana remoteness standard is well reasoned. An arbitrary cutoff of one, three, or five years would deny the trial courts
the discretion to consider the special circumstances of each case,
such as whether the prior act indicates a pattern of behavior in
contrast to an isolated incident, the nature and complexity of the
previously committed act, and a number of other relevant considerations.9 9 In State v. Tecca,9 9 for example, the court approved the
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 1277-78.
See infra text accompanying notes 142-44.
State v. Just, 184 Mont. 262, 268, 602 P.2d 957, 961 (1979).
State v. Matt, Mont. -,
-,
814 P.2d 52, 56 (1991).

96. State v. Doll, 214 Mont. 390, 396, 692 P.2d 473, 476 (1985).
97. State v. Sadowski, 247 Mont. 63, 71, 805 P.2d 537, 541-42 (1991).
98.

See State v. T.W., 220 Mont. 280, 285, 715 P.2d 428, 431 (1986), where the court

found that four years was not too remote because a four-year gap existed between the de-
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admission of other crimes evidence dating back to nine years
before the incident for which the defendant was charged. In Tecca
the evidence showed a continuous pattern of criminal conduct.'
Consequently, the court reasoned that "an isolated incident from
nine years ago is too remote, however, where there is a continuing
pattern of similar conduct, the remoteness problem is
alleviated." 1 0 '
3. Permissible Uses of Other Crimes Evidence-The Third
Element
The Original Just Rule:
The prior conduct must have a tendency to establish a common
scheme, plan or system."0 2
The Modified Just Rule:
The evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity with such character; but may be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. 0 3
The third element is the most significant facet of the Modified
Just Rule. The third requirement under the Modified Just Rule is
merely a reiteration of Rule 404(b), and adds no new criteria. The
significance of the third element is in its elimination of the common scheme requirement, and its corresponding expansion of the
purposes for which other crimes evidence may be introduced.
Other crimes evidence found inadmissible in State v. Brown',
under the original Just Rule illustrates the broader scope of evidence now allowed under the Modified Just Rule. Following a jury
trial, Brown was found guilty of driving under the influence, driving while his license was suspended or revoked, and felony assault. 10 5 The supreme court reversed, holding that evidence of
other crimes Brown committed within the last year was improperly
admitted to prove motive and intent with respect to his conduct in
fendant's
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

opportunities to commit the similar acts.
220 Mont. 168, 172, 714 P.2d 136, 139 (1986).
Id.
Id.
State v. Just, 184 Mont. 262, 268, 602 P.2d 957, 961 (1979).
State v. Matt, Mont.....
-,
814 P.2d 52, 56 (1991).
242 Mont. 506, 510, 791 P.2d 1384, 1386 (1990).
Id. at 508, 791 P.2d at 1385.
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assaulting a police officer. ' Such crimes or acts, the court reasoned, were spontaneous and dictated by Brown's character and
the situation at hand; the prior acts thus lacked any common
scheme or plan, and were, therefore, inadmissible.' 0 7
In Brown, the court found that the prosecution failed to satisfy the third element of the Just Rule; i.e., the state failed to establish the requisite common scheme, plan, or system.'0 8 The evidence had
been admitted
to show motive
and
intent-impermissible purposes under a strict reading of the Just
Rule. Chief Justice Turnage's dissent in State v. Brown foreshadowed the new direction the court would take in the following year:
Under Rule 404(b) the evidence does establish the defendant's
opportunity, motive and intent. Further, the language of Rule
404(b), M.R.Evid., provides a basis for sustaining the introduction of the evidence at issue. The rule provides that such evidence
may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.'0
Chief Justice Turnage's dissent impliedly rejects the application of
the "common scheme, plan or system" criterion in the narrow
manner applied by the majority under the original Just Rule.
Chief Justice Turnage, in effect, argued for a return to the express
language of Rule 404(b) regarding the purposes for which Rule
404(b) evidence could be offered. This return to the express lan0
guage of the rule has now been realized in State v. Matt."1
4. Grounds for Exclusion of Other Crimes Evidence-The
Fourth Element
The Original Just Rule:
The probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the prejudice to the defendant."
The Modified Just Rule:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
106. Id. at 510, 791 P.2d at 1386.
107. Id.; see also State v. Heinrich, 242 Mont. 110, 117, 788 P.2d 1346, 1350 (1990)
(Admission of evidence of prior marijuana offense unrelated to assault charge was reversible
error when the prior offense did not demonstrate a common scheme.).
108. 242 Mont. at 509, 791 P.2d at 1386.
109. Id. at 510-11, 791 P.2d at 1387 (Turnage, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
110. Mont.....-,
814 P.2d 52, 56 (1991).
111. State v. Just, 184 Mont. 262, 269, 602 P.2d 957, 961 (1979).
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prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading of the jury, considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
2
cumulative evidence.1

The fourth element of the Modified Just Rule is merely a verbatim recitation of Rule 403 in its entirety. This element, like the
third element, adds no admissibility requirement beyond what the
Rules of Evidence have always required for all offered evidence.
The Montana Supreme Court has recently determined that
Rule 404(b) should be construed as inclusionary, rather than exclusionary." 3 Trial courts are thus to view Rule 404(b) as generally
permitting such evidence insofar as it does more than merely cast
the defendant's character in a bad light. 11 4 Other crimes evidence
is apparently presumptively admissible. The Montana Supreme
Court has, however, inconsistently taken both inclusionary and exclusionary approaches, often depending on the nature of the crime
with which the defendant is charged. 1
The Montana Supreme Court's recent inclusionary view of
Rule 404(b), as articulated in Sadowski, is well reasoned. On its
face, Rule 404(b) does not purport to exclude other crimes evidence; it merely excludes such evidence when offered to prove a
person's character for the purpose of showing action as conforming
with such character. Additionally, the broad "such as" language of
112. State v. Matt, Mont. __, -,
814 P.2d 52, 56 (1991).
113. State v. Sadowski, 247 Mont. 63, 70, 805 P.2d 537, 541 (1991). See Gezzi v. State,
780 P.2d 972, 974 n.3 (Wyo. 1989), in which the Wyoming Supreme Court observed,
In 2 D. Louisell and C. Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 140, at 36 (Supp. Aug. 1989),
the authors characterize Rule 404(b) as an "inclusionary" rule, as opposed to the
traditional characterization of the rule as "exclusionary," thus emphasizing the
more liberal stance taken by most jurisdictions regarding the admission of prior
bad acts evidence. Nine federal circuit courts have determined that Congress' use
of "such as" in Rule 404(b) commits the federal courts to this inclusionary approach. See e.g. United States v. Moore, 732 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1984); and
United States v. Gustafson, 728 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
979, 105 S.Ct. 380, 83 L.Ed.2d 315 (1984). Also, thirty state jurisdictions have
adopted evidence codes patterned after the liberal federal rules. Under today's
liberal position, exclusion is the exception to the rule of inclusion, which is the
norm. "The true problem in administering this inclusionary principle is not to find
a pigeonhole in which the proof might fit, but to determine whether the prior act
does tend to prove something other than propensity and, if so, to determine
whether its particular relevancy outweighs the risk of prejudice-that is, the risk
that the jury will either draw the forbidden and deadly three-step inference from
bad act to bad person to guilt, or give way to unthinking and emotional impulse to
punish."
Id.
114. For a comprehensive, particularly eloquent, yet sharp attack on the modern trend
to permit other crimes evidence, see Justice Urbigkit's dissent in Gezzi, 780 P.2d at 978-86
(Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
115. See infra text accompanying notes 122-23.
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the second sentence of the rule indicates that the list of permissible purposes for other crimes evidence is not exclusive.1 1 6
Trial courts routinely address issues of competence and relevancy; through their considerable experience dealing with these
fundamental evidentiary principles, trial courts are thoroughly
equipped to apply the plain language of Rule 404(b). Consequently, lower courts have "broad discretion to determine whether
or not [other crimes] evidence is relevant." '
The Montana Supreme Court would clear up much of the confusion surrounding its application of the other crimes rule which
has existed in Montana for the past forty years if the court would
emphasize that (1) the plain language of Rule 404(b) itself is the
trial court's primary guide, and (2) the Montana Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 403,118 apply in the other crimes context." 9 The court could accomplish this result by adopting a
"Sadowski Rule," emphasizing deference to the admissibility determination made by the trial court.
Rule 404(b) provides that other crimes evidence may be admissible for purposes "such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."' 2 ° Attorneys and trial court judges would be better served
by a Montana Supreme Court focus on providing reasoned and
consistent guidance as to what constitutes those specific purposes
enumerated in Rule 404(b), rather than the court's pronouncements of rules which provide limited substantive guidance."'
The inconsistency with which the Montana Supreme Court
has applied the other crimes rule can be best understood by examining the underlying facts of the individual cases brought before
the court. The court generally tends to relax the application of the
rule, thereby giving the state greater freedom in cases in which,
116. But see State v. Ramstead, 243 Mont. 162, 793 P.2d 802 (1990): "Such evidence is
admissible only if it is introduced 'as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.'" Id. at 162, 793 P.2d at 805 (emphasis added).
117. Sadowski, 247 Mont. at 69, 805 P.2d at 541.
118. MONT. R. EVID. 403 requires trial courts to weigh the probative value of proffered
evidence against its potential for causing unfair prejudice.
119. Of course, the Montana Supreme Court has never held Rule 403 inapplicable in
the other crimes context; Rule 403 is incorporated in the Modified Just Rule. However, as
discussed infra, the court does not consistently give proper emphasis to the unfair prejudice
inquiry. See infra text accompanying notes 126-32.
120. MONT. R. EvID. 404(b).
121. See, e.g., State v. Keefe, 232 Mont. 258, 267, 759 P.2d 128, 134 (1988). There, the
Montana Supreme Court provided guidance for the application of the purposes listed as
"plan," "motive," and "identity" in Rule 404(b). Id. Unfortunately, however, Keefe appears
to be an anomaly in the court's jurisprudence in this area.
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from the court's perspective, particularly nefarious crimes are alleged. For example, the Montana Supreme Court is much more inclined to approve the admission of other crimes evidence in cases
in which the defendant is charged with a sex crime involving a
child victim. 12

2

Conversely, the court has demonstrated its reluc-

tance to affirm convictions of alleged rapists where the defendant
met the adult victim in a bar and the lower court proceedings involved other crimes evidence pertaining to offenses involving previous "barroom pickups.

' 123

The court should focus on developing a

more consistent approach in applying existing rules and principles
of admissibility, rather than periodically modifying the principles
themselves.
B.

The Adequacy of the ProceduralProtections in
the Modified Just Rule

In State v. Matt, in conjunction with the adoption of the
Modified Just Rule, the court stated:
[W]e do not overrule the procedural protections required under
Just. We do clarify those protections however by specifically
holding that the following procedural protections shall apply as a
part of the Modified Just Rule.
1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may not be received
unless there has been written notice to the defendant that such
evidence is to be introduced. The notice to the defendant shall
specify the evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts to be admitted, and the specific Rule 404(b) purpose or purposes for which it
is to be admitted.
2) At the time of the introduction of such evidence, the trial court
shall explain to the jury the purpose of such evidence and shall
admonish it to weigh the evidence only for such purposes.
3) In its final charge, the court shall instruct the jury in unequivocal terms that such evidence was received only for the limited
purposes earlier stated and that the defendant is not being tried
and may not be convicted for any offense except that charged,
warning them that to convict for other offenses may result in un122. See, e.g., State v. Eiler, 234 Mont. 38, 50-51, 762 P.2d 210, 218 (1988); State v.
Gilpin, 232 Mont. 56, 67, 756 P.2d 445, 451 (1988); State v. Long, 223 Mont. 502, 507, 726
P.2d 1364, 1367 (1986); State v. T.W., 220 Mont. 280, 286, 715 P.2d 428, 431-32 (1986); State
v. Tecca, 220 Mont. 168, 172, 714 P.2d 136, 138 (1986).
123. See, e.g., State v. Hansen, 187 Mont. 91, 608 P.2d 1083 (1980). As Hansen illustrates, even when the defendant allegedly has engaged in a distinctive practice or method in
carrying out the criminal act, the court sometimes glosses over the method where the overall
act is deemed so commonplace as to have little or no evidentiary value. See supra text
accompanying notes 64-66.
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just double punishment.""
The purpose of providing notice to defendants of the prosecution's intent to introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
is to insure that defendants are fully informed of what acts the
defendants will need to defend against, to avoid surprise at trial.12 8
To be sure, no Montana defendant could legitimately claim prejudicial surprise when the prosecution complies with the strict notice
requirements of the Modified Just Rule.
But the danger of surprise is not the predominant prejudicial
threat where other crimes evidence is involved. Other crimes evidence is, by its nature, prejudicial.1 2 When a defendant is convicted after the prosecution successfully offers Rule 404(b) evidence, a serious question is raised: has the defendant merely been
found guilty of the crime with which the defendant has been
charged, or has the jury returned a verdict predicated on a finding
that the accused's past justifies incarceration? The Montana Supreme Court has recognized that prior crimes evidence is susceptible to misuse by the jury; cautionary instructions and other proce12 7
dural safeguards are thus required.
Do the Modified Just Rule's procedural protections sufficiently safeguard the defendant from the jury's potential misuse of
the offered evidence? Juries may not always be capable of cataloging and categorizing other crimes evidence, particularly when the
"other crime" is inextricably intertwined with the act for which the
defendant is actually charged. Rule 403 of the Montana Rules of
Evidence mandates that the trial court exclude relevant evidence
when "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury. ' '12 From the text of the rule itself, it is apparent that defendants can be unfairly prejudiced; juries can be confused and misled.
Consequently, it is imperative that trial courts rigorously adhere to the requirement of Rule 403, excluding all unduly prejudicial other crimes evidence. The Modified Just Rule's most significant weakness lies in its failure to highlight the importance of the
trial court's responsibility to closely balance the potential of unfair
prejudice against the probative value of proffered other crimes evi124. State v. Matt, Mont....,
, 814 P.2d 52, 56 (1991).
125. State v. Brush, 228 Mont. 247, 250, 741 P.2d 1333, 1335 (1987).
126. State v. Sadowski, 247 Mont. 63, 71, 805 P.2d 537, 542 (1991) (quoting State v.
Medina, 245 Mont. 25, 31, 798 P.2d 1032, 1036 (1990)); see also State v. Just, 184 Mont. 262,
268, 602 P.2d 957, 961 (1979).
127. Sadowski, 247 Mont. at 71, 805 P.2d at 542.
128. MONT. R. EVID. 403.
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dence. Perhaps motivated by a sensitivity to the inherently prejudicial nature of other crimes evidence, the Montana court has unnecessarily complicated the area of other crimes evidence with its
four-pronged Modified Just Rule (the last two prongs of which are
redundant recitations of existing rules of evidence) and threepronged procedural protection requirements. The question of
whether particular other crimes evidence is unfairly prejudicial,
however, is in danger of being lost in a litany of factors trial courts
must address.
State v. McKnight 29 is an example of how the Modified Just
Rule de-emphasizes the importance of the unfair prejudice inquiry.' 30 McKnight involved review of a defendant's conviction for
sexual intercourse without consent, in which the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's admission of testimony of
other victims. 3 1
On its face the court's rationale in McKnight seems reasonable. The testimony of the other victims was properly deemed
highly probative; it provided strong evidence that the defendant
had engaged in numerous other acts which were not only similar to
the charged crime, the other crimes were in some instances indistinguishable. 132 Further, the other sexual assaults occurred within
three years of the charged crime.' 33 The court could have then
carefully addressed the degree to which the other crimes evidence
threatened to unfairly prejudice the defendant, balanced the potential for unfair prejudice against its substantial probative value,
and justifiably concluded that admission of the evidence was
proper. The court should have ended its analysis at this point and
reasonably decided that the probative value of the other crimes evidence was so great that it outweighed the admittedly prejudicial
effect of permitting the jury to hear testimony of the other sexual
assaults. The court in McKnight, however, went one step too far.
The Montana Supreme Court found that the other victims'
testimony "was clearly prejudicial, but because it meets other aspects of the Modified Just Rule, such prejudice alone is not a sufficient reason to refuse admission."'3 " The rule emerging from McKnight appears to be that where the first three elements of the
Modified Just Rule are met, trial courts can properly conclude,
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Mont. -,
820 P.2d 1279 (1991).
Id. at -,
820 P.2d at 1282.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at -, 820 P.2d at 1284 (emphasis added).
-
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without the balancing required by Rule 403, that the other crimes
evidence is not unfairly prejudicial.' 35
IV.

FULL CIRCLE: BACK WHERE WE STARTED

In sum, the Modified Just Rule requires that:
1) The other crimes, wrongs or acts must be similar;
2) The other crimes, wrongs or acts must not be remote in time;
and
3) Montana Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 apply to other
crimes evidence.' 36
Furthermore, to satisfy the procedural protections enunciated in
State v. Matt, the prosecution must give the defendant prior notice that it plans to introduce such evidence and the trial court
must give specific cautionary instructions to the jury, both at the
time the evidence is offered, and in the court's final charge to the
jury.

1 37

A.

A Proposed Substantive Scheme

The Modified Just Rule defeats a fundamental purpose of
Rule 404(b): to provide Montana practitioners with a rule in conformity with the federal rule, for the purpose of uniformity.'3 8
Montana attorneys who practice in state and federal court are
forced to cope with radically different standards for the admissibility of other crimes evidence.' 39 The fact that Montana's Rule
404(b) and'the federal Rule 404(b) are textually identical further
complicates the problem, particularly for the Montana lawyer who
practices in federal court only occasionally.
The text of Rule 404(b) is straightforward. Rule 404(b) disputes arise primarily as a result of a problematic fact pattern in
which other crimes evidence is both relevant and prejudicial. Conforming the application of the rule to the practice in federal courts
would provide Montana trial courts and practitioners with a
135. It can be legitimately argued that thorough consideration of the first three elements of the Modified Just Rule is, in effect, a weighing of the probative value of the proffered other crimes evidence. However, a finding that the other crimes evidence holds significant probative value does not end the inquiry required by Rule 403. Trial courts should not
overlook the possibility that the potential for unfair prejudice may be so great as to outweigh substantial probative value of the evidence.
136. State v. Matt, Mont ....
814 P.2d 52, 56 (1991).
137. Id.
138. See supra text accompanying note 27.
139. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988), (federal courts' treatment of other crimes evidence under FED. R. EvID. 404(b)).
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broader base of cases from which to draw.
To what extent should the courts approach the other crimes
rule differently than the courts deal with other evidentiary rules?
The answer should focus on the degree to which the other crimes
rule itself differs from other rules of evidence. Two notable differences exist: (1) Other crimes evidence, when properly admitted, is
always to be confined to a particular limited purpose, and (2)
Other crimes evidence is, by its nature, more likely to result in undue prejudice than most other evidence. Consequently, any special
treatment of other crimes evidence should address these two considerations as paramount. In all other respects, the courts should
treat other crimes evidence in the same manner in which other evidentiary questions are addressed.
State v. Matt is a step in the right direction; the elimination
of the "common scheme" requirement affords trial courts increased
flexibility in applying Rule 404(b) in close cases. The Just Rule
had developed into a strict framework forcing lower courts to exclude relevant evidence which, in some cases, would have assisted
the trier of fact in reaching a fair result.1 40 In its effort to provide
guidance through the Just Rule, the Montana Supreme Court
forced trial courts to take a more mechanical approach to difficult
admissibility questions, whereas the trial courts' proper inquiry
should focus on relevance and determining the possibility of undue
prejudice.""
Granting greater deference to the trial courts would render the
status of other crimes evidence more consistent with all other evidence. The Montana Supreme Court has, indeed, indicated that all
four elements of the Just Rule need not be shown to establish admissibility, in State v. Sadowski.' 42 The court in Sadowski, relying
on its holding in State v. T. W.,14 3 explicitly stated that "failure to

meet one element of the Just formula was not enough to refuse
admission of prior acts.'

4

This critical issue is not often high-

lighted in the Montana Supreme Court's analysis.
140. When a defendant urged the Utah Supreme Court to adopt the protections of
Montana's Just Rule, the court responded: "We decline to adopt that rigid procedure."
State v. Rocco, 795 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1990).
141. For example, Idaho applies a simple two-tiered test in determining whether evidence of other bad acts or crimes may be admitted: (1) the evidence must be relevant to a
material issue concerning the crime charged, and (2) the probative value of the other crimes
evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect. State v. Arledge, 808 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1991). Idaho appellate courts grant great deference to the trial judge whose ruling
"will not be disturbed on appeal, unless [the trial court's] discretion has been abused." Id.
142. 247 Mont. 63, 71, 805 P.2d 537, 542 (1991).
143. 220 Mont. 280, 715 P.2d 428 (1986).
144. Sadowski, 247 Mont. at 71, 805 P.2d at 542.
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A solution to the confusion would be for the Montana Supreme Court to focus on consistency with its treatment of other
evidentiary questions and on the federal courts' approach to Rule
404(b). Specifically, the Montana Supreme Court should clarify
and emphasize that the similarity and nearness requirements of
the Modified Just Rule are factors for the trial court to consider,
rather than as absolute prerequisites for admissibility.1 45 When
other crimes evidence is offered, the primary focus of trial courts
should be on the text of existing rules of evidence. To accomplish
this result, the Montana Supreme Court should consider adopting
the following criteria for the admission of other crimes evidence:
1) The evidence must be offered 4 for
a purpose other than to
6
merely prove a person's character;'
2) The evidence must be relevant;' 7 and
3) The probative value of the evidence must outweigh the danger
'4
of undue prejudice, in light of other available means of proof.
B.

A Proposed ProceduralScheme

Existing Montana Rules of Evidence, to a degree, provide for
the procedural protections of the Modified Just Rule. For example,
regarding the cautionary jury instructions required under the
Modified Just Rule, Rule 105 of the Montana Rules of Evidence
provides: "When evidence which is admissible as to one party or
for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict
the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly."'' 49 The jury instructions required under the Just procedural
protections likewise are mandatory only when a party requests
them.' 50 In light of the existence of Rule 105, the requirement of
cautionary jury instructions under the procedural protections of
the Modified Just Rule is redundant.
145. State v. Wells, 202 Mont. 337, 348-49, 658 P.2d 381, 387-88 (1983); State v. Van
Natta, 200 Mont. 312, 319-20, 651 P.2d 57, 60-61 (1982). In Wells and Van Natta the Montana Supreme Court discussed the elements of the Just Rule as factors to consider; implicit
in this characterization is the notion that all the Just elements may not necessarily be indispensable prerequisites.
146. MONT. R. EVID. 404(b). The evidence should not be excluded, however, if it incidentally reflects negatively on a person's character. Permissible purposes include, but are
not limited to, those enumerated in Rule 404(b).
147. MONT. R. EVID. 401. The relevance inquiry should include examination of the similarity and remoteness of the other crime as factors for the trial court to consider.
148. MONT. R. EvID. 403.
149. MONT. R. EVID. 105.
150. State v. Stroud, 210 Mont. 58, 72, 683 P.2d 459, 466 (1984).
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The other procedural requirement under the Modified Just
Rule mandates that the prosecution give advance notice of its intent to introduce other crimes evidence at trial. To that end, the
Federal Commission on Rules of Evidence has proposed amending
Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence as follows:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrialnotice on good cause shown, of the general nature
of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.'1"
The notice requirement of the proposed amendment to Rule
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence does not contain the comprehensive provisions of the Just Notice currently mandated by
the Montana Supreme Court under Matt. Under the proposed
amendment, the accused has the burden of requesting advance notice of the prosecution's intent to introduce other crimes evidence.
As in civil litigation, the party desiring the information would have
the burden of requesting it. The proposed amendment to the federal rule also gives the trial court the flexibility to excuse a lack of
notice when appropriate under the circumstances. Nonetheless, the
accused would still be afforded a similar degree of procedural protection provided under the protections of the Modified Just Rule.
V.

CONCLUSION

Other crimes evidence in Montana has historically been subject to changing standards of admissibility. Consequently, when
confronted with the issue of other crimes evidence, the practitioner
must carefully examine and rely on the most recent cases addressing the issue. Rule 404(b) questions are the subject of a considerable number of appeals each year;152 thus, the practicing lawyer
151. 129 F.R.D. 357, 378 (1990).
152. In 1990 the Montana Supreme Court heard thirteen appeals involving Rule
404(b) questions: State v. Gambrel, 246 Mont. 84, 803 P.2d 1071 (1990); State v. West, 245
Mont. 298, 800 P.2d 1047 (1990); State v. Kao, 245 Mont. 263, 800 P.2d 714 (1990); State v.
Matt, 245 Mont. 208, 799 P.2d 1085 (1990); State v. Medina, 245 Mont. 25, 798 P.2d 1032
(1990); State v. Johnstone, 244 Mont. 450, 798 P.2d 978 (1990); State v. Christensen, 244
Mont. 312, 797 P.2d 893 (1990); State v. Ramstead, 243 Mont. 162, 793 P.2d 802 (1990);
State v. Brown, 242 Mont. 506, 791 P.2d 1384 (1990); State v. Newman, 242 Mont. 315, 790
P.2d 971 (1990); Smith v. Roosevelt County, 242 Mont. 27, 788 P.2d 895 (1990); State v.
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needs to be familiar with the court's most recent pronouncements.
Conversely, the Montana lawyer should not view the Montana
Supreme Court's latest decision as the court's final word on the
subject of other crimes evidence. By carefully analyzing the most
recent decisions, practitioners should familiarize themselves with
the specific issues upon which the court has most recently placed
greatest emphasis. Still, lawyers must recognize the court's tendency to periodically change the admissibility standards of other
crimes evidence and should not be surprised when the court occasionally alters the criteria.
The Montana Supreme Court should place increased emphasis
on the plain language of the applicable rules of evidence, along
with greater deference to trial court determinations. By adopting
this article's approach, Montana courts would eliminate the redundancy and potential for confusion inherent in the Modified Just
Rule. A renewed emphasis on the plain language of Rules 403 and
404(b) would place other crimes evidence back in the mainstream
with all other evidence and would still adequately address the special considerations involved when other crimes evidence is offered.
Moreover, because trial courts are in the better position to balance
relevance and the potential for unfair prejudice in the cases over
which they preside, an increased deference to trial courts' admissibility rulings is particularly appropriate. This approach will make
the trial judge's job easier and would significantly benefit prosecutors and the defense bar alike, by providing the consistency and
stability needed in Montana's criminal justice system.

Heinrich, 242 Mont. 110, 788 P.2d 1346 (1990); and State v. Conrad, 241 Mont. 1, 785 P.2d
185 (1990).
In 1991 the Montana Supreme Court heard ten appeals involving Rule 404(b) questions: State v. Kordonowy, Mont. -,
823 P.2d 854 (1991); State v. Johnson, Mont.
-,
821 P.2d 1039 (1991); State v. Wolfe, Mont. -,
821 P.2d 339 (1991); State v.
McKnight, Mont. -,
820 P.2d 1279 (1991); State v. Paulson, Mont. -,
817 P.2d
1137 (1991); State v. Baker, Mont. __, 815 P.2d 587 (1991); State v. Matt, Mont.
-,
814 P.2d 52 (1991); State v. Goodwin, Mont. -. , 813 P.2d 953 (1991); State v.
Croteau, 248 Mont. 403, 812 P.2d 1251 (1991); and State v. Sadowski, 247 Mont. 63, 805
P.2d 537 (1991).
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